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RESEARCH NOTE
EXPLORING SURVEY DATA FOR
HISTORICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL
RESEARCH: MUSLIM–CHRISTIAN
RELATIONS IN SOUTH-WEST NIGERIA
INSA NOLTE, REBECCA JONES, KHADIJEH TAIYARI AND
GIOVANNI OCCHIALI*
ABSTRACT
This research note argues that quantitative survey data on Africa, wel-
comed by most researchers in public health, economics, and political sci-
ence, can make an important contribution to the work of historians and
anthropologists, especially if it is open to critical analysis. The research
note describes the 2012–13 ‘Knowing Each Other’ survey on religion
among the Yoruba of south-west Nigeria, which provides strong evidence
for a slow shift from Islam to Christianity in the area since 1963, and
reﬂects on the methods and challenges of carrying out the survey and the
resulting biases within it. In doing so, the research note draws out lessons
on how to use surveys for historical and anthropological research. It also
shows how using surveys contributes to understanding the complex and
unexplored dynamics of Muslim–Christian relations in Nigeria from the
perspectives of locality, age, and gender.
*Insa Nolte (m.i.nolte@bham.ac.uk) is Reader in African Studies, Rebecca Jones (r.k.jones@
bham.ac.uk) is Postdoctoral Research Fellow, and Giovanni Occhiali (GXO214@bham.ac.uk)
is Statistical Research Fellow, all at the University of Birmingham. Khadijeh Taiyari (khadijeh.
taiyari.10@ucl.ac.uk) is a PhD student at University College London. The authors gratefully
acknowledge funding by the European Research Council (ERC) for a Starting Researcher
Grant entitled ‘Knowing Each Other: Everyday religious encounters, social identities and toler-
ance in south-west Nigeria’ (Grant agreement no. 283466, PI Insa Nolte). The authors thank
Christian Hennig and Ioannis Kosmidis for commenting on some of the statistical concerns
arising from the material. They are grateful for the comments made by participants in the
African History Seminar at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, the Africa
Seminar at the School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, and the African History
and Politics Seminar at the University of Oxford, where earlier versions of this article were pre-
sented by Insa Nolte. J. D. Y. Peel and two anonymous reviewers of the article have provided
helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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SCHOLARSHIP ON AFRICA HAS BEEN SHAPED in very speciﬁc ways by the
poverty of quantitative data, compared with the data wealth that informs
debates about many other parts of the world. As Morten Jerven has
pointed out, the implications of data poverty for economic policy making
are potentially dramatic.1 Washington-based institutions such as
USAID, Afrobarometer, and the Pew Forum have produced important
survey work on public health, elections, political attitudes and processes,
and religion since the 1990s. As reports on measurable conditions of life
and reﬂections of public opinion, these surveys have been welcomed
enthusiastically by researchers in public health, economics, and political
science, but they have been largely ignored by historians and anthropolo-
gists. Focusing on the ‘Knowing Each Other’ (KEO) survey on religion,
this research note demonstrates that a critical engagement with quantita-
tive data can also oﬀer a signiﬁcant contribution to disciplines that rely
primarily on discursive analysis, particularly in terms of suggesting
hypotheses or relationships for more ﬁne-grained investigation.
Importantly, the KEO survey provides evidence for a slow shift from
Islam to Christianity in south-west Nigeria since 1963. But beyond this,
a critical discussion of the production of survey data on the ground, and
the resulting ﬂaws and biases of the survey, contributes to an under-
standing of the complex and hitherto unexplored dynamics of Muslim–
Christian relations in Nigeria from the standpoints of locality, age, and
gender. The ﬁrst lesson we suggest in this research note is that the pro-
cesses and problems of conducting a survey itself, as well as its analysis,
oﬀer important insights into the social reality of a country or region.
The challenges associated with data collection in many African contexts
are rarely discussed openly, whether it is quantitative or qualitative research.2
As Jerven has pointed out, many African social and political practices can
only be captured partially through formal processes.3 Often, data collection is
also limited by entrenched political or economic interests, or by the diﬃculty
of gaining direct access to sections of the population living in areas that are
diﬃcult to access or are under the control of groups and leaders that discour-
age the collection of information. Moreover, in some contexts, survey data in
Africa have been associated with the production of false responses. Several
anonymous interlocutors who had commissioned or participated in the exe-
cution of surveys in Nigeria and other West African countries in the past
1. Morten Jerven, Poor numbers: How we are misled by African development statistics and what
to do about it (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2013); Morten Jerven, ‘Research note –
Africa by numbers: Reviewing the database approach to studying African economies’, African
Aﬀairs, 115, 459 (2016), pp. 342–58.
2. Cf. Christopher Cramer, Deborah Johnson, Carlos Oya, and John Sender, ‘Research
note – Mistakes, crises, and research independence: The perils of ﬁeldwork as a form of evi-
dence’, African Aﬀairs 115, 458 (2015), pp. 145–60.
3. Jerven, Poor numbers, esp. pp. 45–54.
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spoke to us about their suspicions of data falsiﬁcation and their personal
experience of survey teams ﬁlling in questionnaires or paying urban audi-
ences to complete surveys destined for rural, remote, or ostensibly danger-
ous areas. But even when surveys had to be re-ﬁelded following such
problems, the potential impact of these diﬃculties on the data is rarely
discussed. In this research note we describe how we anticipated and
addressed some challenges in our own survey work, and we also explain
in what ways the diﬃculties that arose from our speciﬁc approach and
focus contributed to the survey’s biases. Paying critical attention to these
issues is another important lesson: both for the production of accurate
and reliable survey data, as well as for a broader understanding of dynam-
ics related to gender, age, religion, class, and so on.
In addition to the collection of data, the production of reliable survey
results requires a sampling frame representative of the surveyed popula-
tion. Owing to the overall data poverty of many African countries, there is
little agreement or even debate on appropriate sampling frames, which
means that the quality of newly produced data cannot be assessed pre-
cisely. While many institutions (and the survey companies on which they
rely) base their work on ready-made sampling frames, the processes by
which these frames are constituted are not always discussed openly. This
makes it diﬃcult to say to what degree survey responses are representative
for all those not included in the survey, and it closes possible avenues for
critical interrogation. This research note suggests that the exploration of
diﬀerent sampling frames for calibration oﬀers a useful base both for the
conﬁrmation of ﬁndings and for critical reﬂection and analysis. The man-
ner in which this was done in the problematic context of religious aﬃli-
ation and belief in Nigeria may oﬀer some suggestions or lessons for
future survey design in other areas and on other topics.
Finally, again like qualitative research, survey data reﬂect biases through
the way in which questions are framed and responses are elicited. Survey
data always echo the inequalities, concerns, and preoccupations shaping
the lives of survey producers and respondents, but this does not mean
that surveys should be dismissed. The contextual biases of historical sur-
veys in Africa have been explored as evidence in their own right.4
Additionally, the fact that ‘it is diﬃcult not to think in terms of the ontolo-
gies that are globally dominant in one’s own time’5 undoubtedly shapes
all forms of academic enquiry. The KEO survey data do not engage
4. See, for example, Lorelle D. Semley, Mother is gold, father is glass: Gender and colonialism
in a Yoruba town (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 2011), Chapter 5; Helen
Tilley, Africa as a living laboratory: Empire, development, and the problem of scientiﬁc knowledge,
1870–1950 (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 2011).
5. Peter Pels, ‘What has anthropology learned from the anthropology of colonialism?’,
Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale 16, 3 (2008), pp. 280–99: p. 283.
543EXPLORING SURVEY DATA
 at U
niversity of Birm
ingham
 on A
ugust 11, 2016
http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
substantially with current reﬂections on the nature of Yoruba Islam and
Christianity as local expressions of global religions,6 and the very focus of
this research note – the overall shift in religious identiﬁcation from Islam
to Christianity – was not originally planned. However, once our pilot study
revealed that such a shift might have taken place (see below), we adjusted
our research to take account of it, and we consider the resulting ﬁndings a
valuable contribution to the study of how gendered and generational social
identities in Yorubaland reﬂect the coexistence of Islam and Christianity.
The lesson from this is that whilst surveys should not be treated as unprob-
lematic expressions of ‘the truth’, they can also provide systematic insights
into the lifeworlds of large numbers of respondents in ways that make unex-
pected ﬁndings possible and provocative arguments more credible.
In existing survey work, the reluctance to discuss methodological diﬃcul-
ties often leads to the silencing of unexpected research results. For example,
the results of an Afrobarometer survey that suggested a shift from Islam to
Christianity in south-west Nigeria similar to that revealed by the KEO sur-
vey were never published in textual form.7 In other contexts, the unwilling-
ness to discuss methodologies in detail has led to the production of
contradictory data, which can entail all sorts of hidden problems for subse-
quent researchers. For example, the Pew Forum suggested that Nigeria had
a Muslim majority of 52 percent, conﬁrming the stronger historical presence
of Islam revealed by censuses in the 1950s and 1960s and taking account of
the fact that Christianity had expanded more strongly among remaining
non-monotheists.8 A year later, the same institution noted that with just
under 48 percent of the population identifying as Muslim, the country had
‘no clear religious majority’.9 The Pew Forum’s adjustment of its own num-
bers reﬂected the results of a larger-scale public health survey by the
National Population Commission that indicated a Christian majority among
its respondents.10 As neither this process not the quality of the new data
were discussed in an open and easily accessible manner,11 the apparently
6. J. D. Y. Peel, Christianity, Islam, and Orisa-religion: Three traditions in comparison and
interaction (University of California Press, Oakland, CA, 2016).
7. The relevant dataset is available but the ﬁndings are neither highlighted nor published in
a report. Personal communication with Peter Lewis, School of Advanced International
Studies, Washington, 25 November 2013.
8. Pew Forum, ‘Tolerance and tension: Islam and Christianity in sub-Saharan Africa’,
2010, <http://www.pewforum.org/ﬁles/2010/04/sub-saharan-africa-full-report.pdf> (11
February 2014), pp. 12, 20.
9. Pew Forum, ‘The future of the global Muslim population’, 2011, <http://www.pewfor-
um.org/ﬁles/2011/01/FutureGlobalMuslimPopulation-WebPDF-Feb10.pdf> (5 October
2015), p. 110.
10. National Population Commission, Nigeria demographic and health survey 2008 (Federal
Republic of Nigeria, Abuja, 2009).
11. The Nigeria demographic and health survey 2008 noted that less than 45 percent of its
respondents were Muslim while 54 percent were Christian. But while the National
Population Commission’s datasets are the largest that included religion in Nigeria, its public-
544 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
 at U
niversity of Birm
ingham
 on A
ugust 11, 2016
http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
contradictory survey ﬁndings were largely ignored. However, both surveys
assured readers that levels of conversion between monotheist religions were
low,12 and most scholars assumed that where people had already converted
to Islam and Christianity, they were unlikely to have changed religion again.
This mistaken assumption contributed to the KEO survey’s strong
bias towards the southern parts of south-west Nigeria, because it
informed our original decision to carry out the survey in twelve geo-
graphically contingent local government areas in Lagos, Ogun, and
Ondo states, whose religious composition had been similar to that of
south-west Nigeria as a whole in the 1960s. Although we later
included six local-government areas from northern Nigeria, the raw
survey data retain a strong bias towards southern Yorubaland.
Moreover, the social context in which we carried out the survey con-
tributed to a small under-representation of young respondents and an
over-representation of women. Adjustment for the socio-demographic
biases within the survey illustrates that the overall shift towards
Christianity reﬂects geographical, gendered, and generational diﬀer-
ences that invite historical and anthropological reﬂection, while also
revealing social constellations that continue to favour Islam.
A tentative reﬂection on the diﬀerent survey biases suggests that both
Muslim and Christian identities are shaped by the diﬀerential forma-
tion of religious and political communities, the historical association
of Western education and Christianity, and interpersonal dynamics
shaped by patrilineal patterns of belonging and gendered forms of
authority in marriage and family life.
The next section explains how the survey was designed and adjusted to
produce these controversial ﬁndings about a shift toward Christianity in
the region. As such it shows how a well-designed survey – when the ﬂaws,
limitations, and biases are acknowledged – can open up important new
lines of empirical enquiry for subsequent researchers.
The Knowing Each Other survey: conception, organization, and biases
The KEO survey was conceived in order to contribute to the emerging
ﬁeld of research on religious and especially Muslim–Christian encoun-
ters in Africa by focusing on the Yoruba of south-west Nigeria.13
health surveys exclude important sections of the population by age, making an extrapolation
for the national level problematic. National Population Commission, Nigeria demographic and
health survey 2008, p. 31.
12. Pew Forum, ‘Tolerance and tension’, p. 66.
13. Cf. Benjamin Soares (ed.), Muslim-Christian encounters in Africa (Brill, Leiden, 2006);
Shobana Shankar, Who shall enter paradise? Christian origins in Muslim northern Nigeria, ca.
1890–1975 (Ohio University Press, Athens, OH, 2014); Peel, Christianity, Islam, and Orisa-
religion.
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Yoruba speakers converted in signiﬁcant numbers to both Islam and
Christianity during the twentieth century. The 1952 census in the area
of the present-day states of Ekiti, Kwara, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun,
and Oyo indicated a slightly larger Muslim (43.3 percent) than
Christian (38 percent) population.14 However, by the time of the 1963
census (the last to include information on religious identiﬁcation in
Nigeria), percentages of Yoruba Muslims and Christians were, with
46.3 percent and 45.5 percent respectively, roughly equal.15 While
both censuses were criticized for distorting regional population num-
bers, there has been no suggestion that numbers of Muslims and
Christians within individual regions were manipulated.16 Without data
suggesting otherwise, the assumption that the equal numerical pres-
ence of both religions contributed to the overall peaceful relations
between Muslims and Christians has buttressed much of the reﬂection
on Yoruba Muslim–Christian relations.
As the ﬁrst large-scale survey of religious identiﬁcation in Yorubaland
since 1963, the KEO survey aimed at providing insight into the inci-
dence of bi- and multi-religious constellations including Muslims,
Christians, and traditionalists in diﬀerent social contexts, and it invited
respondents to comment on typically ethnographic topics including kin-
ship, marriage, everyday practices, and moral expectations.17 Reﬂecting
a shared research interest in the history and anthropology of coastal
Yorubaland by Insa Nolte and Olukoya Ogen, the survey originally
included twelve local government areas in the southern Lagos, Ogun,
and Ondo states. As explained above, the area’s religious composition
was roughly equivalent to that of Yorubaland as a whole in the 1952
and 1963 censuses, and we had planned the survey in a geographically
contingent area as a basis for further, in-depth qualitative research in the
future.
14. ‘Other’ religious identities were reported for 18.6 percent of the population. These
numbers are calculated for the present-day Ekiti, Kwara, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and
Oyo states (also covered by the KEO survey) on the basis of the calculations in Philip Ostien,
‘Percentages by religion of the 1952 and 1963 populations of Nigeria’s present 36 states’
(Nigerian Research Network Background Paper No. 1, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford,
2012).
15. ‘Other’ religious identities were reported for 8.2 per cent of the population. These
numbers are calculated for the present-day Ekiti, Kwara, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and
Oyo states (also covered by the KEO survey) on the basis of the calculations in Ostien,
‘Percentages by religion’.
16. Cf. S. A. Aluko, ‘How many Nigerians? An analysis of Nigeria’s census problems,
1901–63’, Journal of Modern African Studies 3, 3 (1965), pp. 371–92; Babatunde A. Ahonsi,
‘Deliberate falsiﬁcation and census data in Nigeria’, African Aﬀairs 87, 349 (1988), pp. 553–
62.
17. For a ﬁrst discussion of the survey, see Insa Nolte and Rebecca Jones, ‘The Knowing
Each Other survey’, 6 November 2014, <http://www.knowingeachother.com/2014/11/06/the-
knowing-each-other-survey/> (1 June 2015).
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The survey questionnaire was developed in several iterations, and the
ﬁnal version was agreed after a pilot study in two local government areas
in Osun State (Ede North and Ede South) was completed, which means
that data from these two areas are not completely consistent with those
from the other 16 local government areas.The pilot study also suggested
that the assumption of stability in Muslim–Christian relations was not
realistic, and in response we expanded the survey and obtained
responses from an additional six local government areas from the nor-
thern Ekiti, Kwara, Osun, and Oyo states. We based the number of
responses collected in every area on the oﬃcial – if disputed – overall
population numbers of the 2006 population census, but, for reasons set
out below, did not always achieve exact calibration by age and gender.
Between April 2012 and August 2013, 2,819 respondents from 18 local
government areas in the seven predominantly Yoruba-speaking states
contributed to the survey. Table 1 and Map 1 illustrate the survey’s bias
towards southern Yorubaland.
Table 1. Locations of the KEO survey
State Number
of local-
government
areas
Names of local-
government areas
Location of survey Urban/
rural
Lagos 1 Ikorodu Ikorodu (Lagos) urban
Ogun 9 Remo North Ode, Iraye, Ilara rural
Ikenne Ikenne, Irolu, Iperu rural
Remo South Sagamu town urban
Odogbolu Odogbolu town urban
Ijebu-Ode Ijebu-Ode town urban
Ijebu North Ijebu-Igbo town, Ago-Iwoye,
Awa
urban/
rural
Ijebu North East Atan, Odosenlu,
Odosimadegun
rural
Ijebu East Ogbere, Ijebu-Ife, Ijebu-
Imusin
rural
Ogun Waterside Abigi, Eﬁre rural
Ondo 2 Okitipupa Okitipupa town, Ilutitun urban/
rural
Irele Ode Ajagba rural
Osun 3 Irewole Ikire rural
Ede North Ede town urban
Ede South Ede town urban
Oyo 1 Ibadan North Agbowo (Ibadan) urban
Ekiti 1 Ekiti West Ikogosi, Aramoko rural
Kwara 1 Oﬀa Oﬀa town urban
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As Table 1 shows, the local-government areas in southern Yorubaland
are balanced roughly equally between rural areas and medium-sized
towns, such as Ijebu-Igbo, Ijebu-Ode, Ikorodu, Odogbolu, Okitipupa, and
Sagamu. However, the northern local-government areas are predominantly
urban and include Ibadan, Ede (two areas), and Oﬀa.18 While only two
Map 1. The KEO survey in south-west Nigeria.
18. Setting the cut-oﬀ point at roughly 100,000 inhabitants, we recognize that several of
the localities we have designated as rural are large settlements. In the absence of population
numbers for the towns (rather than the LGAs in which they are situated, or of which they are
part) our categorization also reﬂects the presence of secured hotels, closed shops (rather than
market stalls), the local presence of traders in motor parts (rather than mechanics), books,
and other goods associated with distinctly urban consumption such as electronics.
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local-government areas cover the large and densely populated cities of
Lagos and Ibadan, the higher population numbers of many urban local-
government areas mean that the survey is dominated by responses from
medium-sized urban environments. It is diﬃcult to assess in what way this
bias inﬂuences survey results until better contextual data are produced.
Finally, our only sample for Oyo State is a local government area in Ibadan
North, which has attracted a number of Christian residents associated with
the University of Ibadan. Oyo State comprises of many historically Muslim
towns, including large cities like Oyo and Ogbomoso, and our sample for the
state is therefore likely to over-represent Christians.19 Conversely, in Osun
State, the survey was carried out in three strongly Muslim local-government
areas, even though the state also has a signiﬁcant Christian population
centred on the cities of Ile-Ife and Ilesa.20 It is therefore likely to be biased
towards Muslims. It is impossible to assess how these two biases at state level
aﬀect the overall survey result until better data are produced.
The survey team included male and female members, all of whom were
trained in research methods, including ethically required protocols.21 All
team members were closely supervised and monitored throughout the
ﬁelding of the survey by Olukoya Ogen and Insa Nolte.22 The team
included members of both Muslim and Christian backgrounds, and great
care was taken to ensure that no team member showed any reservation
regarding traditional practices, and that everyone could pronounce the
traditional Yoruba proverbs and sing the traditional songs included in the
questionnaire. Team members also kept ﬁeldwork diaries in which they
noted their experiences and observations.
Respecting local norms, Nolte and Ogen visited all survey locations to
obtain permission for the survey from local government oﬃces and, where
applicable, the traditional head of the settlement. Only when all stake-
holders had granted permission did team members move into the relevant
locality. In several towns and villages Nolte and Ogen also recruited add-
itional team members whose knowledge of the locality enabled the team
to move more freely. Team members visited compounds, houses, or insti-
tutions early in the morning or afternoon in order to be able to explain
and obtain permission for their work from the heads of compounds or
other decision makers. While team members consistently encouraged
19. Oyo Division (which included Oyo and Ogbomoso) had a much more signiﬁcant
Muslim majority than Ibadan Division in both 1952 and 1963. Ostien, ‘Percentages by reli-
gion’, p. 11.
20. Both Ife and Ilesha divisions had signiﬁcant Christian majorities in 1952 and 1963.
Ostien, ‘Percentages by religion’, p. 11.
21. These protocols included the need to ensure respondents’ consent, anonymity, and
ability to withdraw.
22. Team members included Adebayo Adewusi, Rita Ajayi, Tosin Akinjobi, Kehinde
Akinduro, Nurudeen Arogundade, Yemi Balogun, and Charles Omotayo.
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younger people to oﬀer responses, the team’s respectful recourse to senior
family members meant that older respondents were slightly more likely
than younger ones to provide responses.
Survey team members asked for responses from both men and women
at every compound, house, or institution. Diﬀerent questionnaires were
given to men and women to capture practices related to polygyny.23
We aimed for an equal response rate from men and women, but collected
more valid responses from men than from women during our pilot study
in Ede (Osun State).24 In response to this problem, team members
explained our expectations to female respondents, but also oversampled
women in Ogun State, the next survey location. We eventually found that
we could keep track of gender ratios without oversampling.25 However,
our strong focus on Ogun State meant that we have slightly more
responses from women than from men overall.
Team members withdrew all but one copy of surveys where answers
and responses to open questions that elicited individual narratives were
identical. They also withdrew surveys when at least two team members
agreed that surveys had not been completed by, or on behalf of, a
respondent. Team members also experienced rejection, and respondents
refused to complete questionnaires for a number of reasons, including
mistaking the team members for tax collectors or government representa-
tives. In some rural communities, survey questionnaires were also col-
lected (but never returned) by individuals selling food where
questionnaire paper was later seen being used as food wraps. It is diﬃcult
for us to assess in what ways these misunderstandings and local strategies
may have contributed to bias within the survey; but again, one of the les-
sons of this research note is that such experiences provide insights into the
politics and social relations of the areas under study.
Completed questionnaires were taken to the University of Birmingham,
where Rebecca Jones oversaw their entry (in both Yoruba and English) into
an electronic database, and the translation of Yoruba responses into
English by a UK-based team.26 Textual responses are still being translated
and categorized.27 This research note discusses only the socio-demographic
23. The questionnaires diﬀered between men and women only in the part related to mar-
riage, so data were comparable in all other respects. The main survey had an overall total of
165 entry categories for men (who had the option to comment on present marriages of up to
four wives) and 152 entry categories for women (who were only asked about their present
husband).
24. In several cases, women from the same compound produced identical surveys on which
they had agreed internally. We withdrew all but one of such questionnaires.
25. Once we explained clearly that the value of the survey was to capture diﬀerences even
among women in a compound, we received very few collective responses.
26. Team members working on translations included Oluwakemi Olabode, Olufemi
Ogundayo, and Omolara Fasanmi.
27. We are grateful to Olufemi Ogundayo for having taken on this task.
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data explored through SPSS and STATA by Khadijeh Taiyari and
Giovanni Occhiali.
The KEO survey: bias and respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics
In the opening section of the KEO survey we asked respondents to tell us
what their religion was. Aware that the complex religious landscape of
Yorubaland might mean that respondents did not ﬁt into pre-deﬁned cat-
egories, we deliberately left the answer open.28 Out of 2,819 respondents,
only three individuals did not indicate a religion and only six gave idiosyn-
cratic responses.29 Clearly, the fact that our question presumed the pres-
ence of a religion may have discouraged respondents’ self-identiﬁcation as
atheist or agnostic, even though the opportunity to answer ‘none’ was
potentially available (and was sometimes used to describe parents’ or
grandparents’ religion). However, the vast majority of respondents made
reference to three clear and ostensibly unambiguous religious categories,
deﬁning themselves either as Muslim, Christian, or traditionalist.
The unadjusted results of the KEO survey, set out in Table 2, indicate
that there was an overall Christian majority of 67.1 percent among our
respondents. Roughly a third, or 31.6 percent, of respondents told us they
were Muslims and the remaining 1.3 percent of our respondents identiﬁed
themselves as traditionalists. To ensure better comparison we have excluded
from our tables below the nine responses, or 0.3 percent of our respondents,
that did not ﬁt into these categories. Missing answers are generally excluded.
As Table 2 shows, the raw survey data reﬂect a number of biases arising
from our ﬁeldwork methodology and the geographical bias of the survey.
The separation of survey responses from northern and southern
Yorubaland conﬁrms that Christianity is more strongly represented in the
southern Yoruba states. This implies a geographical shift in religious identi-
ﬁcation. According to the 1963 census, the west and centre of Yorubaland,
including the current states of Lagos, Ogun, Osun, Oyo and Kwara, were
predominantly Muslim, while only the eastern areas of the current states of
Ekiti and Ondo were overwhelmingly Christian.30 The KEO survey con-
ﬁrms the ongoing importance of Islam in northern Yorubaland, but it sug-
gests that Ogun and Lagos states are, like the Yoruba east, predominantly
Christian today. In addition, the survey reﬂects important diﬀerences
according to geographical location, residence, age, and gender.
28. In the English version of the KEO survey, we used the same formulation as used by the
2011 British Household Census but did not provide any tick boxes.
29. The six responses that did not ﬁt into the three religious categories used in the table
included ‘Non-aﬃliate’, ‘Religion is a believe [belief] and what you think is aspectable
[acceptable] for yourself’, ‘Religion is the thanks we give to Almighty Allah’, ‘Traditional and
Christian’, ‘I serve God’, and ‘Means total ways of worship God [sic]’.
30. Ostien, ‘Percentages by religion’, pp. 10–11.
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In order to explore these biases, it is important to explore how an
adjustment of survey data changes the overall results. As in all calibrations
of survey data, re-weighting exercises assume that the KEO distribution of
respondents’ religion represents the actual distribution of religion. In add-
ition, the quality of adjustments depends on the quality of the available
data used for weighting. One of the simplest sampling frames for a survey
are population numbers. However, Nigeria’s exact population numbers
remain disputed. The CIA World Factbook estimates the Nigerian popu-
lation in 2006 to have been 131.8 million while the World Bank suggests
a population of 143.3 million, leaving a diﬀerence of almost 12 million
people. In the same year the 2006 census data produced by the National
Table 2. KEO survey respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics by
current religion
Socio-demographic
characteristics
Christian
N (%)
Muslim
N (%)
Traditionalist
N (%)
Total
N (%)
All responses 1880 (67.1) 894 (31.6) 36 (1.2) 2819 (100)
Geographical location
Southern Yorubaland (Lagos,
Ogun, Ondo states)
1475 (74.5) 471 (23.8) 34 (1.7) 1980 (100)
Northern Yorubaland (Oyo,
Osun, Ekiti, Kwara states)
405 (48.9) 422 (50.9) 1 (0.2) 829 (100)
Total 1880 (66.9) 893 (31.8) 35 (1.3) 2809 (100)
Residence (urban/rural)
Rural (settlements < 100,000) 744 (76.4) 210 (21.6) 20 (2.1) 974 (100)
Urban (cities and
towns > 100,000)
1136 (61.9) 684 (37.3) 16 (0.9) 1836 (100)
Total 1880 (66.9) 894 (31.8) 36 (1.3) 2810 (100)
Age
Under 25 200 (66.2) 101 (33.4) 1 (0.3) 302 (100)
26–30 273 (66.4) 136 (33.1) 2 (0.5) 411 (100)
31–35 325 (69.9) 136 (29.2) 4 (0.9) 465 (100)
36–40 311 (67.9) 140 (30.6) 7 (1.5) 458 (100)
41–45 257 (67.6) 118 (31.1) 5 (1.3) 380 (100)
46–50 208 (68.2) 92 (30.2) 5 (1.6) 305 (100)
51–55 147 (69.3) 62 (29.2) 3 (1.4) 212 (100)
56–60 65 (72.2) 23 (25.6) 2 (2.2) 90 (100)
61–65 22 (48.9) 21(46.7) 2 (4.4) 45 (100)
66–70 17 (45.9) 17 (45.9) 3 (8.1) 37 (100)
76+ 11 (36.7) 19 (63.3) 0 (0.0) 30 (100)
Total 1836 (67.1) 865 (31.6) 34 (1.2) 2735 (100)
Gender
Female 1090 (72.5) 408 (27.1) 6 (0.3) 1504 (100)
Male 789 (60.5) 486 (37.2) 30 (2.3) 1305 (100)
Total 1879 (66.9) 894 (31.8) 36 (1.3) 2809 (100)
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Population Commission of Nigeria aﬃrmed that the country had a popu-
lation of 140.4 million.31
In the absence of an undisputed statistical frame that would enable us to
run a quantitative (probability) sampling strategy, the KEO survey cannot
produce data considered statistically representative in the strict sense.32 But
as this limitation has aﬀected all recent surveys in the area, a critical engage-
ment with existing data is nonetheless productive. The 2006 census pro-
vides information on population, age, and gender at the national, state, and
local government levels which allows us to weight the KEO data with sur-
vey data speciﬁcally produced for the seven states covered by the survey.
We also consider adjustments of KEO data with reference to information
provided by the World Bank on urbanization and the CIA World Factbook
on age and gender for the national level. These adjustments provide clear
examples of ways in which raw survey data can be subjected to further crit-
ical scrutiny, and they suggest points of connection to broader qualitative
literatures on the politics of identity in Africa.
Adjusting for survey biases
An adjustment of the data for the survey’s geographical bias oﬀers an
important insight into the KEO survey’s under-representation of
Muslims. An adjustment based on 2006 census data takes into account
uneven sampling of the diﬀerent Yoruba states, including our strong over-
sampling of Ogun State and our slight oversampling of Osun State. All
other states are undersampled, but the most signiﬁcant undersampling is
in Lagos, whose respondents only constitute 5.8 percent of the KEO sur-
vey but 30 percent of the population according to the 2006 census.
As Map 1 illustrates, Kwara State includes signiﬁcant populations that are
not primarily Yoruba-speaking. However, neighbouring Kogi State, which is
not included in the survey, has several Yoruba-speaking communities. As
the exact boundaries of ethnic belonging are disputed, we decided to
approximate the population of Yoruba speakers in this area by basing our
calculations on the overall population numbers for Kwara State. In Table 3,
an adjustment of survey results by state – in other words, as if the sampling
had been done reﬂecting the state population numbers of the 2006 census –
suggests that the KEO survey slightly oversampled Christians.
The survey’s revelation that respondents from urban environments are
more likely to be Muslims than respondents from rural areas reﬂects the
31. National Population Commission, 2006 Population and housing census, Volume IV popu-
lation distribution by age & sex (state & local government area) (Federal Republic of Nigeria,
Abuja, 2010).
32. Cf. Charles Teddlie and Fen Yu, ‘Mixed methods sampling: A typology with exam-
ples’, Journal of Mixed Methods Research 1, 1 (2007), pp. 77–100.
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fact that responses from the northern Yoruba states, where Islam is more
established, were mainly collected from urban environments. However,
even in southern Yorubaland the numbers of Muslim respondents from
urban areas were higher than those from rural areas. Yet an adjustment for
the survey’s rural–urban bias is of limited value because World Bank data
on Nigeria’s rural–urban population divide suggest that only 46 percent of
Nigeria’s population lived in an urban environment in 2013.33 As south-
west Nigeria constitutes a highly urbanized part of the country, we do not
consider this weighting, which would suggest that we undersampled
Muslims, indicative. Nor do we have a frame for an alternative adjustment.
The urban population rate implied in the KEO survey is 63.3 percent.
Beyond location and residence, our socio-demographic data illustrate
that Muslim–Christian diﬀerence is clearly associated with age, with
Christianity most strongly represented among those between 35 and 60
years of age in 2012–13. This is the age bracket that is over-represented in
our survey, while respondents under the age of 30 are under-represented.
As a result it is important to adjust responses by age cohort.34 In Table 4
we oﬀer two adjustments of overall survey results by age, ﬁrst based on
the age pyramid given by the CIA World Factbook for the national level,35
and then based on the data on age provided by the 2006 census for the
seven states covered by the KEO survey only.
As Table 4 shows, both weightings suggest a small over-representation
of Christians, with the 2006 census data suggesting a slightly greater bias.
As the weighting according to the CIA data is less exact owing to the
aggregation at the national level and the use of larger age brackets,36 and
Table 3. KEO survey results weighted by state population (2006 census)
Christian
(%)
Muslim
(%)
Traditional
(%)
Total
(%)
Ekiti, Kwara, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun,
Oyo states
64.3 35 0.7 100
33. The World Bank, ‘Urban population (% of total)’, <http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS> (23 June 2015).
34. In Lagos, we have no responses from males in the youngest age cohort, which means
that the overall adjustment still reﬂects a slight bias against young (male) respondents.
35. Our adjustment largely replicates the age brackets provided at CIA Factbook, ‘Africa:
Nigeria’, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html> (12
September 2015).
36. This adjustment is a little uneven, as we were, for ethical reasons, only permitted to col-
lect responses from those aged 18 and above. The CIA age cohorts start with 0–14 years and
are followed by 14–25 years. While the ﬁrst category could be ignored (for our purposes), we
have used the same weight for the category of 18–25 year-olds as that of the CIA category 14–
25, making this adjustment less indicative than the others. The adjustment also required the
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as the 2006 data on age reﬂect both the slightly higher life expectancy for
south-west Nigeria and the greater attraction of cities like Lagos and
Ibadan for young people, we consider it likely that the adjustment by the
2006 census data is more indicative.
Finally, our socio-demographic data point to a remarkable diﬀerence in
male and female religious identiﬁcation, with women signiﬁcantly more likely
to identify as Christians than men. Given the oversampling of women in the
survey, it is therefore useful to check whether an adjustment according to
available data on the gender distribution, again provided by the CIA World
Factbook for the national level, changes results. The weightings in Table 5
assume that the overall gender distribution in the area covered by the survey
reﬂects the gender distributions given by the CIA World Factbook for the
national level,37 and the same for the average gender distributions given by
the 2006 census for the seven states covered in the survey.
As Table 5 shows, an adjustment of the survey data by gender again
indicates a small oversampling of Christian respondents. As in Table 4,
the overall diﬀerences between these weightings are small, suggesting that
our oversampling of women had only a small eﬀect on the overall survey
results. However, weighting with the 2006 census data suggests a slightly
greater bias toards Christianity in the KEO survey, and we assume that
Table 4. KEO survey results weighted by age cohort
Age cohort Christian
(%)
Muslim
(%)
Traditionalist
(%)
Total
(%)
CIA World Factbook,
national level
65.8 33 1.2 100
2006 census 65.3 33.4 1.3 100
Table 5. KEO survey results weighted by gender
Gender Christian
(%)
Muslim
(%)
Traditional
(%)
Total
(%)
CIA World Factbook, national
level
66.6 32.1 1.3 100
2006 census 66.3 32.3 1.4 100
merging of slightly diﬀerent age categories, as the CIA age cohorts start a year earlier than the
KEO ones. However, the impact of this on the overall result is likely to be small.
37. The overall gender ratio for Nigeria is relatively equitable at 1.04 male(s)/female.
However, it is clearly marked as ‘estimated’. See CIA Factbook, ‘Africa: Nigeria’.
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their greater geographical precision makes these numbers more indicative
than the ones oﬀered by the CIA factbook.
The above adjustments of the KEO survey data all indicate a relatively
small under-representation of Muslims (and over-representation of
Christians), but as they weighted responses by one factor only it is worth
exploring what adjustment for more than one factor at a time reveals. As
far as the data upon which the adjustment is based are reliable, a double
adjustment can reveal whether and to what degree the survey’s bias
towards Christianity increases as adjustments for more factors are made.
As Table 6 illustrates, the double adjustments for state population and
age, using diﬀerent national-level and state-level data to weight for age,
point in slightly diﬀerent directions. While the adjustment according to
the national-level data suggests an under-representation of Christians by
0.7 percent, the state-level data conﬁrm that the survey under-represents
Muslims but do not suggest that bias within the survey is cumulative.
The double adjustment for both state population and gender presented
in Table 7 again demonstrates similar results for adjustments with
national-level and state-level data for gender. The weighting according to
2006 census data suggests a stronger undersampling of Muslims than in
the individual weightings for state population and gender, but still only by
0.5 percent. This suggests that our oversampling of women in Ogun State,
where the gendered shift towards Christianity ﬁnds strong expression,
Table 6. KEO survey results weighted cumulatively by state
population and age
Christian
(%)
Muslim
(%)
Traditional
(%)
2006 census for population (state level) CIA
World Factbook for age (national level)
67.8 31.6 0.7
2006 census for population and age (both at
state level)
64.5 34.8 0.7
Table 7. KEO survey results weighted cumulatively by state
population and gender
Christian
(%)
Muslim
(%)
Traditional
(%)
2006 census for population (state level) CIA
World Factbook for gender (national level)
64.3 35 0.7
2006 census for population and gender (both
at state level)
63.9 35.5 0.6
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aﬀects the survey ﬁndings more strongly than is revealed by adjustments for
one factor only.
Additional cumulative adjustments for state population, gender, and
age do not reveal further cumulative biases within the survey. However,
they compound assumptions about the validity of the data used for
weighting. In four states where we collected smaller samples, the KEO
survey does not include data on all gendered age brackets. This includes
the youngest age bracket for males in Lagos State, and three age brackets
over 60 for females in Ekiti, Kwara, and Oyo states. Only better data can
reveal to what degree the absence of these data has impacted on the
adjustments above. However, the impact of the missing data is certain to
increase in cumulative adjustment.
Overall, most adjustments of the survey suggest that the Muslim share
of the sample is underweighted. Apart from the urban–rural weighting we
consider unrepresentative of Yorubaland, the adjustment by state popula-
tion and age (national-level data) is the only reweighting which gives a
higher share to Christians. As Table 8 shows, the re-weightings based on
oﬃcial data suggest that the actual shares of Muslims and Christians diﬀer
by less than four percent from the KEO survey ﬁndings. Even so, it is pos-
sible that our data contain errors that cannot be rectiﬁed by adjustment,
and aggregate in a manner that we have not recognized.
However, we believe that the consistency of our ﬁndings supports our
overall argument that Yorubaland has seen a slow shift towards
Christianity since 1963. As we set out in the next section, the diﬀerent
biases revealed by our adjustments also suggest that there are important
social constellations that support Islam. Moreover, the diﬀerent factors
implicated in the complex relationship between Yoruba Muslims and
Christians point to new approaches to the study of Muslim–Christian rela-
tions in south-west Nigeria and beyond. One lesson that can be drawn
from this is that the critical exploration of survey results can be seen as the
starting point for new lines of research.
Trajectories of Muslim–Christian relations
As the KEO survey conﬁrms the relative growth of Christianity in
Yorubaland since the 1960s even after various adjustments for its relative
Table 8. Range of adjusted KEO survey results
Muslim (%) Christian (%) Traditional (%)
Overall numbers 31.6–35.5 63.9–67.8 0.7–1.4
Variation 3.9 3.9 0.7
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oversampling of Christian respondents, its ﬁndings illustrate the potential
contribution of quantitative research to qualitative inquiry simply by
revealing the cumulative impact of change over decades. A closer look at
the biases in the survey points to a number of lines of exploration that
engage with, and challenge, existing debates about trajectories of West
African religion, Muslim–Christian relations, and religious encounter.
The noticeably stronger increase of Christianity in formerly Muslim
parts of southern Yorubaland than in northern Yorubaland suggests
that diﬀerent factors inﬂuence religious change in the north and south
of south-west Nigeria. As a particular aspect of Muslim–Christian
encounter, Muslim–Christian conversion in West Africa has not
received much scholarly attention.38 However, the ‘conversion’ to
Pentecostal Christianity among Christians has been explained as a
response to the decline of the central economic role of the state.
Especially attractive to successful migrants in large cities, Pentecostal
messages reﬂect and shape the ambitions of self-consciously modern,
educated, and urban-based individuals.39 Certainly, this dynamic
might explain the relatively strong historical increase of Christians
documented by the KEO survey for the southern Yoruba states, which
are dominated by the self-conscious modernity associated with the cit-
ies of Lagos and Ibadan.
However, the relatively stronger presence of Muslims in the medium-
sized urban environments sampled by the survey indicates that the rela-
tionship between urbanity and conversion is more complex. While only
Ilorin in Kwara State became an Emirate,40 most Yoruba Muslim com-
munities are organized at the town level, oﬀering Muslims the opportunity
to participate in town politics as Muslims and on behalf of their religious
community.41 The signiﬁcantly greater resilience of Islam in northern
Yorubaland suggests that the creation of exclusively Muslim compounds
and quarters, which occurred during the nineteenth century primarily in
northern Yoruba towns, also plays an important role in entrenching
Islam. Muslim quarters and compounds are home to extended patrili-
neages and often exclude non-Muslim descendants from important
38. But see Rosalind Hackett, ‘Prophets, “false prophets”, and the African state: Emergent
issues of religious freedom and conﬂict’, Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent
Religions 4, 2 (2001), pp. 187–212.
39. Ruth Marshall-Fratani, ‘Mediating the global and local in Nigerian Pentecostalism’,
Journal of Religion in Africa 28, 3 (1998), pp. 278–315; Birgit Meyer, ‘Christianity in Africa:
From African independent to Pentecostal-Charismatic churches’, Annual Review of
Anthropology 33 (2004), pp. 447–74; Ruth Marshall, Political spiritualities: The Pentecostal revo-
lution in Nigeria (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL and London, 2009).
40. See for example, Stefan Reichmuth, Islamische Bildung und soziale integration in Ilorin
(Nigeria) seit ca. 1800 (LIT Verlag, Münster, 1998), pp. 43–53.
41. T. G. O. Gbadamosi, The growth of Islam among the Yoruba, 1841–1908 (Longman,
London, 1978); Peel, Christianity, Islam, and Orisa-religion, pp. 152–70.
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resources or aspects of decision making. Therefore, those who rely on the
patrilineage for their livelihoods are unlikely to abandon Islam.
The survey’s revelation of the dramatic shift from Islam towards
Christianity among those 60 and younger in 2012–13 – those born in or
after 1952 – also indicates that universal primary education, introduced in
all Yoruba-speaking states except Kwara in 1955,42 encouraged conver-
sion. Although the introduction of universal primary education was a
secular policy, the dominance of mission education during the colonial
period meant that by the 1950s the vast majority of teachers were
Christian and often associated successful education with Christianity.
While not all children who started school during that period converted,
Muslim observers were disconcerted by the fact that many did.43 The sur-
vey data show that within each age bracket the percentages of Muslims
and Christians have remained relatively stable since the 1950s. This sug-
gests that many of those who converted as children retained and passed
on their Christian identity as they grew older, thus contributing to an
incremental growth of Christianity in the overall population. Public health
surveys in Nigeria and other African contexts suggest that reproductive
rates reﬂect a number of social distinctions, including religious diﬀer-
ence.44 It is thus possible that the slightly higher numbers of Muslims
among younger respondents reﬂect diﬀerential rates of biological
reproduction.
In addition to education, decisions about religious identity are likely to
reﬂect both the diﬀerent possibilities for gendered agency and religious
subjectivity encouraged by these religions.45 In this context, we speculate
that women’s greater attraction to Christianity reﬂects both its more expli-
cit recognition of female religiosity and its institutionalization of female
religious participation.
42. This educational policy was introduced by the Action Group Government of Chief
Obafemi Awolowo, who had become the premier of the then self-governing Western Region
in 1954. Reﬂecting the relative administrative independence of the regions at the time, the
policy was speciﬁc to the Western Region. It was ended by the military coup of 1966.
43. Cf. D. O .S. Noibi, Yoruba Muslim youth and Christian-sponsored education (Shebiotimo
Publications, Ijebu-Ode, 1987). The problematic nature of universal primary education for
the Muslim community was highlighted by Yoruba Muslim leaders at the time. The conver-
sionary dynamic also occurred in other parts of Nigeria where free primary education was
introduced. See Marg Csapo, ‘Universal primary education in Nigeria: Its problems and
implications’, African Studies Review 26, 1 (1983), pp. 91–106: p. 101.
44. National Population Commission, National demographic and health survey 2013
(Federal Republic of Nigeria, Abuja, 2014), pp. 65–80. Like its predecessors, the National
Demographic and Health Survey 2013 does not provide direct data on religion and fertility.
While fertility data at state and zone level conﬁrm that overall levels of fertility tend to be
higher in states and zones with strong Muslim populations, there are exceptions to this
trend.
45. Cf. Murray Last, ‘Some economic aspects of conversion in Hausaland (Nigeria)’, in
Nehemia Levtzion (ed.), Conversion to Islam (Holmes and Meier, New York, NY and
London, 1979), pp. 236–46.
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The gendered and generational religious diﬀerences illuminated by the
KEO survey may be mutually constitutive. The gendered adherence to
Islam and Christianity suggests that marriages and relationships between
Muslim men and Christian women, which are sanctioned by Islam, are
frequent. The slightly higher number of Muslims among younger respon-
dents suggests that, privileging paternal authority, the children of such
unions are usually brought up in their fathers’ religion. However, slightly
higher numbers of Christians among older respondents might indicate
that a signiﬁcant number of young people convert to Christianity when
they are ﬁnancially independent and/or married.
If indeed most Muslim–Christian converts are women, it is not clear
how the current trajectory of religious change transforms interreligious
relations. As the conversion of Muslim women has no direct impact on
the number of compounds and households headed by Muslim men, and
consequently of Muslim children, it may explain the relatively low degree
of controversy about the overall shift to Christianity. However, the
entrenchment of religious diﬀerence between Yoruba men and women
would challenge the understanding of religious communities as coherent
in the sense that they can support independent social reproduction.
Clearly an exploration of these conjectures requires further research into
the role of religious diﬀerence in intimate relationships between the sexes
and the generations. Where religious diﬀerence is associated with gen-
dered and generational identities it illuminates the boundary between
Islam and Christianity as highly permeable and calls for further historical
and anthropological study.
Conclusion
Discussing the KEO survey’s ﬁndings about the shift towards Christianity
in south-west Nigeria since the 1960s, this research note oﬀers a number
of lessons on survey work, both generally and in the context of producing
survey data for qualitative research. The processes and problems of con-
ducting a survey oﬀer important insights into the social reality of a coun-
try or region. In the case of the KEO survey, such insights served as a ﬁrst
basis for reﬂection on possible survey biases. Furthermore, the production
of accurate and reliable survey data relies on a careful reﬂection on the
challenges of survey work. An open discussion of research challenges,
potential biases, and other adjustments can substantiate overall ﬁndings
and encourage a careful and critical evaluation of the diﬀerences in reli-
gious identiﬁcation. In the KEO survey, the biases that arose from our
approach and from the diﬀerential engagement of individuals with the
survey contributed to our understanding of the importance of geograph-
ical location, residence, gender, and age for religious identiﬁcation.
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In addition, the exploration of diﬀerent sampling frames for calibration
oﬀers a useful base both for the conﬁrmation of ﬁndings and for critical
reﬂection and analysis. An open discussion of sampling frames (and their
limits) illustrates in what ways survey results produced in data-poor con-
texts may be problematic. The diﬃculties of ﬁnding appropriate sampling
frames for the KEO survey can be a useful starting point for researchers
planning survey work in Nigeria and other African countries.
Moreover, an open discussion of research challenges, potential biases,
and other adjustments can substantiate overall ﬁndings and encourage a
careful and critical evaluation of survey results. Like qualitative data, sur-
veys are shaped by the context of their production and do not provide
results that are unassailable. However, by aggregating and comparing the
experiences and attitudes of individuals of very diﬀerent backgrounds,
surveys can provide insights into broader trends that might otherwise be
overlooked and which can form the basis of qualitative analysis. In the
KEO survey, diﬀerences in religious identiﬁcation according to locality,
age, and gender, tentatively pointed to a dynamic relationship at the inter-
personal and intergenerational level between Yoruba Muslims and
Christians.
Finally, survey results open to critical discussion can serve as the start-
ing point for new lines of qualitative research. The trajectories of religious
change and coexistence through the ‘dialectics of conversion over genera-
tions’46 revealed by the KEO survey illustrate the potential relevance of
quantitative data beyond the constituencies normally served by surveys. If
survey data can form the basis for critical debate and reﬂection, and
ultimately for the production of new insights into African historical
and social practice, historians, sociologists, and anthropologists of Africa
need more of it.
46. David Maxwell, ‘Response to Joel Robbins’, Current Anthropology 48, 1 (2007), pp. 25–
6: p. 26.
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